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Federal Tax-Exemption Requirements For Joint
Ventures Between Nonprofit Hospital Providers and
For-Profit Entities: Form over Substance?
Gary J. Young*
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty years, many tax-exempt hospital providers have
formed joint ventures with for-profit entities.' Some of these joint ventures
were formed in order to market and provide specialized outpatient medical
services,' such as diagnostic imaging centers, ambulatory surgical centers,
and physician office buildings, while others were formed to allow
struggling local hospitals to benefit from the management expertise of
successful healthcare services companies.3 Other joint ventures, however,
involve the entire hospital whereby a for-profit entity has an ownership
position in the hospital itself.4 Tax-exempt hospital providers have
undertaken these ventures in response to powerful industry-wide
competitive and reimbursement pressures. 5
Such arrangements between exempt hospital providers and for-profit
entities, particularly those involving for-profit involvement in the
* Associate Professor and Co-Director, Program on Health Policy and Management, Boston
University School of Public Health; Associate Director, Center for Organization, Leadership
and Management Research, Department of Veterans Affairs. The author appreciates the
research assistance of Matthew Guldin, a former student at Boston University, in preparing
this manuscript.
1. See infra Section III.B. A joint venture is:
[A]n association of two or more persons or entities that undertake a project with a
community of interests in the performance of common purposes, a proprietary
interest in the subject matter, a right to govern and direct the policy in connection
therewith, and a duty... to share in both profits and losses.
Rochelle Korman & Dahlia Balsam, Joint Ventures with For-ProfitsAfter Revenue Ruling
98-15, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 441, 441 (2000). See generally Ross E. STROMBERG &
CAROL R. BOMAN, JOINT VENTURES FOR HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS: LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS 1-33 (Sandra L. Weiss ed., 1986).
2. See infra Section III.A.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See infra Section III.B.
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management and ownership of tax-exempt hospitals, have raised issues
regarding the tax-exempt status of the participating providers.6 The IRS has
adopted a controversial rule addressing tax exemption for hospital providers
that form joint ventures with for-profit entities.7 The adoption of this rule,
which focuses on the hospital provider's degree of operational control over
the venture,8 has been followed by two related cases that resulted in
controversial decisions by the Tax Court 9 and, very recently, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals.' 0
This article discusses the IRS rule on hospital joint ventures and related
legal developments. The central thesis is that the IRS's emphasis on
operational control is misplaced from both a legal and a policy perspective,
and reflects the Service's focus on the form of a joint venture's governance
rather than the substance of its charitable activities. Section II of this article
provides an overview of the federal tax-exemption requirements for
hospitals. Section III discusses the prevalence of joint ventures between
tax-exempt hospital providers and for-profit entities and the factors
motivating the formation of these arrangements. Section IV reviews the
IRS rule on joint ventures between tax-exempt hospital providers and forprofit entities and two major cases that applied its underlying principles.
Section V examines critically the legal and policy underpinnings of the IRS
rule. Section VI offers concluding remarks.

6. See, e.g., Kevin F. Donohue, Crossroads in Hospital Conversions: A Survey of
Nonprofit Hospital Conversion Legislation, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 39, 58 (1999); David A.
Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy and Regulatory Follies, 23 J. CoRP. L. 741,
741-48 (1998); Gary J. Young & Kamal R. Desai, Nonprofit Hospital Conversions and
Community Benefits: New Evidence from Three States, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at
146-55. See also Kara Marschke, Protecting the Public Interest: The Role of the State
Attorney General in Regulating Hospital Conversions, 42 HosP. & HEALTH SERV. ADMIN.
546, 547-48 (1997) (discussing a variety of legal and public policy concerns related to the
conversion of hospitals from nonprofit to for-profit). See generally John D. Colombo,
PrivateBenefit, Joint Ventures, and the Death of Healthcare as an Exempt Purpose, 34 J.
HEALTH L. 505 (2001) (tracing the use of the private benefit doctrine as a criterion for tax
exemption in healthcare, and particularly as to joint ventures). In addition to tax issues, joint
ventures between tax-exempt hospitals and for-profit companies have raised concerns about
the impact of for-profit ownership on the delivery of healthcare services. See generally
various authors, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997 (Special Issue: Hospital & Health Care
Conversions).
7. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. See also infra Section IV.A.
8. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. See also infra Section IV.A.
9. See infra Section IV.B.
10. See infra Section IV.C.
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II. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION
REQUIREMENT FOR HOSPITALS

The federal tax exemption for hospitals represents a significant public
investment in the healthcare services industry. Most nonprofit hospitals are'
exempt from federal corporate income tax," which, by one estimate,2
translates to well over four billion dollars in forgone federal tax revenue.'
Another four-plus billion dollars is lost to states and local jurisdictions that
likewise exempt hospitals from taxes. 3 Because the United States invests
such sums in nonprofit healthcare, there are necessarily legal safeguards in
place to insure that the public investment in nonprofit hospitals serves its
intended goals. This section of the article discusses the legal requirements
for federal tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals.
A. CharitableExemption Requirements
Hospitals qualify for federal income tax exemption under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), which applies to
"[c]orporations... organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific.., or educational purposes."' 14 To assess generally
whether an organization qualifies for exemption under section 501(c)(3),

11. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit
Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV; 307, 309-24
(1991). Approximately sixty percent of U.S. hospitals are voluntary nonprofits institutions.
See AM. Hosp. Ass'N, FAST FACTS ON U.S. HOSPITALS, available at http://
www.hospitalconnect.com/aha/resource center/fastfacts/fast facts US hospitals.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2003). For-profit hospitals are not eligible for federal tax exemption. See
infra Section II.A.
12. John Copeland & Gabriel Rudney, Federal Tax Subsidies for Not-For-Profit
Hospitals, 26 TAX NOTES 1559, 1565 (1990). Copeland's and Rudney's estimate of 4.5
billion dollars in forgone federal tax revenue is based on data from the late 1980s. The
figure might well be significantly higher if it were calculated today.
13. Hall & Colombo, supra note 11, at 324-26. Many states and localities confer, as a
matter of course, corporate income tax and property tax exemptions on 501(c)(3) entities, in
accordance with the federal approach that is discussed infra Section II.A. See also Copeland
& Rudney, supra note 12, at 1565 (estimating that state and local tax exemptions amounted
to as much as four billion dollars in forgone annual tax revenues in the late 1980s).
The American concept of the charitable
14. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2000).
organization as a legal entity originates from the charitable trusts of English statutory and
common law. Andras Kosaras, Federal Income and State Property Tax Exemption of
Commercialized Nonprofits: Should Profit-Seeking Art Museums Be Tax Exempt, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 115, 126-27 (2000). The English Statute of Charitable Uses was first enacted
in 1601 to prevent the misappropriation of charity monies. Id. Historically, charity, as
legally defined, included "trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of
education, trusts for the advancement of religion, and trusts for other purposes beneficial to
community not falling under any of the preceding heads." Id.
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15
the IRS applies two tests, one organizational and the other operational.
The organizational test requires that the organization's formative documents
(i.e. articles of incorporation, partnership agreement, etc.) limit the
organization solely to exempt activities and forbid it from engaging in
activities not in furtherance of its stated exempt purposes. 16 The operational
test focuses in principle on an organization's activities.17 The IRS has
interpreted section 501 (c)(3) to require organizations to engage primarily in
activities that accomplish one or more of the exempt purposes set forth in
the statute. 1 8 The operational test will not be satisfied if more than an
insubstantial part of the organization's activities is not in furtherance of an
exempt purpose.19
Although section 501(c)(3) does not mention healthcare specifically as
an exempt purpose, the IRS has long recognized that hospital care may
qualify as a charitable purpose under certain conditions. 20 Although early

15. Section 501(c)(3) states that an organization must be organized and operated solely
for the organization's enumerated exempt purposes. John D. Colombo, Charitable Tax
Exemption, in HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW 5-3 (Mark A. Hall ed., Supp. 1999); BRUCE R.
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 109-22 (6th ed. 1992).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i) (2003). The organizational test requires also
that the assets of the organization be dedicated to a charitable purpose and that, should the
organization be dissolved, its assets be distributed for exempt purposes, or, alternatively,
transferred to a governmental unit. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1 (b)(4).
17. Colombo, supra note 15, at 5-4, 5-5. Although the operational test is intended to
focus on an organization's activities, I argue in this article that the IRS legal position on
hospital joint ventures largely ignores the joint venture's actual activities or substantive
performance.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
19. Id. Whether an organization has a substantial nonexempt purpose is a question of
fact to be resolved on the basis of the evidence in the administrative record. Living Faith v.
Comm'r, 950 F.2d 365, 371 (7th Cir. 1991), aff'g T.C. M. (CCH) 1990-484; B.S.W. Group
Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352, 357 (1978). The applicant seeking exemption has the burden
of proof to demonstrate that it is operated exclusively for exempt purposes. Id.
20. While the promotion of health has long been recognized to be a charitable purpose,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 368, 372 (1959), courts have held that the mere

promotion of health may not be enough to support a tax exemption under section 501 (c)(3).
See, e.g., Sonora County Hosp. v. Comrn'r, 46 T.C. 519, 525-26, aff'd, 397 F.2d 814, 814
(9th Cir. 1968) ("While the diagnosis and cure of disease are indeed purposes that may
furnish the foundation for characterizing the activity as 'charitable' something more is
required."). Still, there has been a longstanding debate among tax experts as to whether
Congress, in enacting section 501(c)(3), contemplated the term "charitable" in its narrow
sense, meaning relief to the poor, or in a broader sense that is more consonant with the
common-law understanding that charity extends to promoting the well-being of people in
general, regardless of socioeconomic status. Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces; Changes
in For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Health Care Delivery Structures: A Regeneration of Tax
Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 41 (1995); Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer,
Tax Administration as Health Policy: Hospitals, the Internal Revenue Service, and the
Courts, 16 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L., 251, 256 (1991). Current IRS regulations provide

that the term "charitable" is used in section 501(c)(3) in its broader sense encompassing not
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IRS rulings stated that hospital care was a charitable purpose only if
provided to the poor,21 the IRS broadened its view in response to the advent
of the Medicare and Medicaid programs that dramatically expanded health
insurance coverage in the U.S. and substantially reduced the number of
Americans unable to obtain reimbursed healthcare services. In 1969, the
IRS issued a revenue ruling announcing a promotion-of-health rationale for
granting tax-exempt status to hospitals, reasoning that the delivery of
healthcare services for the general benefit of the community is inherently a
charitable purpose.22 The ruling set out several factors the Service would
consider in evaluating a hospital's qualification for tax-exempt status under
the promotion-of-health rationale. These factors, which constitute the socalled community benefit standard, are: operate a 24-hour emergency room;
provide charity care to the extent of the hospital's financial ability; extend
medical staff privileges to all qualified physicians in the area, consistent
with the size and nature of the facility; accept payment from the Medicare
and Medicaid programs on a nondiscriminatory basis, and maintain a
community-controlled board, i.e. a governing board with membership
primarily from the local community. 23 A hospital that meets this standard
only relief to the poor, but also "advancement of religion; advancement of education or
science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the
burdens of Government; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to
accomplish any of the above purposes." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). See generally
Douglas M. Mancino, A Contemporary Reexamination of Revenue Ruling 69-545 and the
Promotion of Health Rationale for Exemption, 34 J. HEALTH L. 615 (2001); Hall &
Colombo, supra note 11, at 319-23.
21. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (stating that tax exemption was
available only to those hospitals that " operated to the extent of [their] financial ability for
those not able to pay for services rendered"). Rev. Rul. 56-185 did not set out any objective
criteria for assessing whether a hospital is operating to the extent of its financial ability in
serving indigent patients, but rather allowed for such assessments to be conducted on the
basis of the applicable facts and circumstances. Colombo, supra note 15, at 5-5.
22. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. There has been much debate about whether this
ruling created a new exemption policy for healthcare organizations or merely expanded the
existing policy articulated in Rev. Rul. 56-185. Although the IRS's official position was that
the ruling did not announce new policy, the issue became the subject of litigation in Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Schultz, 370 F. Supp 325, 336-38 (D.D.C. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1286 (D.C. Cir.
1974), vacated on other grounds 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976). In Eastern Kentucky, a court of
appeals reversed a district court's decision that Congress, in enacting section 501(c)(3),
intended to restrict the term "charitable" to its narrow sense meaning relief of the poor. Id.
The court of appeals concluded that Congress contemplated a broader and more flexible
definition. Id. See generally Fox & Schaffer, supra note 20, at 259-73 (tracing the evolution
of IRS statutory interpretation and policy promulgation as to healthcare exemptions).
23. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. Commentators have noted that, among the
factors set out in this ruling, the IRS attaches particular weight to an open emergency room
and unrestricted provision of care to Medicare/Medicaid patients. Colombo, supra note 15,
at 5-7. Still, in Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94, proposed in Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,669
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qualifies as a public charity and stands to enjoy the significant benefits of
public charity status, including an exemption from the federal corporate
income tax and the substantial fund-raising advantage of a fifty percent
personal income tax deduction to financial benefactors.2 4
In addition, in order to qualify for federal tax exemption, an organization
must limit private benefit. IRS regulations state that exempt organizations
must serve public, rather than private, interests.26 That is, the organization's
activities should benefit the community as a whole. While an exempt
organization's activities may result in some private benefit,27 the private
28
benefit must be merely incidental to the broader community benefit.
Related to private benefit is the prohibition on private inurement, namely
that "no part of the net earnings of [the organization] inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual., 29 The IRS has defined private
shareholders, or "insiders," as "individuals whose relationship with an
organization offers them an opportunity to make use of the organization's
income or assets for personal gain. 3 ° While insiders are typically persons
highly placed in an organization, like corporate directors or officers,
insiders in the healthcare setting may also include members of a hospital's

(Mar. 30, 1981), the IRS indicated that a hospital need not have an emergency room to
qualify for exemption if it could show that: (1) adequate emergency room services already
existed in its community and (2) the hospital satisfied other factors of the community benefit
standard.
24. The 1.R.C. creates two categories of exempt organization-public charities and
private foundations-but explicitly limits hospitals to public charity status. Hospitals (like
other organizations) that qualify for both tax exemption and status as public charities enjoy
substantial advantages over foundations, namely larger tax deductions to donors, fewer
reporting requirements, and fewer restrictions overall. See I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(a)(iii),
509(a). See also Colombo, supra note 15, at 5-34-43.
25. One other major restriction on section 501(c)(3) eligibility, not directly apposite to
the present discussion, involves political activities, namely that no substantial part of a
501(c)(3) organization's activities may be used to influence legislation nor may a 501(c)(3)
organization participate in any political, campaign for or against any candidate for public
office. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See generally Colombo, supra note 6.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii).
27. And, as the IRS has pointed out, it is inevitable in some cases that private parties
will benefit from the charitable activities of an exempt organization. Gen. Couns. Mem.
37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978). For example, when an organization is formed to preserve and
protect a lake, the organization's goals and activities are charitable even if the preservation
of the lake happens to benefit property owners near the lake as well as the general public. Id.
28. Id. See also Rochelle Korman & William F. Gaske, Joint Ventures Between TaxExempt and Commercial HealthcareProviders, 16 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 773, 775 (1997).
The private benefit doctrine has provoked much debate over its meaning and scope. See
.generally Colombo, supra note 6.
29. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
30. I.R.S. Announcement 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59, *7-*10.
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medical staff,31 and thus joint ventures between a hospital and members of
its medical staff may raise private inurement issues.32
There are also circumstances in which an organization that cannot itself
qualify for tax-exempt status may qualify by virtue of being an integral part
of an exempt organization. 33 The integral-part doctrine allows an
organization to derive exempt status through its relationship with a
501(c)(3) entity, namely by conducting activities that are essential to the
exempt purposes of the 501(c)(3) entity, and that would not comprise an
"unrelated trade or business" if the 501(c)(3) entity conducted the activities
itself.34 In the healthcare industry, the integral part doctrine may be used to
claim exempt status for entities that are part of integrated delivery systems
organized around exempt hospitals. 35 However, the entity claiming
derivative exemption must be structurally and financially integrated with
or purposes. 6
the exempt hospital and must not just serve similar functions
B. Conduct of Non-Exempt Activities
While a 501(c)(3) organization must operate primarily to further its
exempt purpose, the organization may also conduct non-exempt activities
as long as the activities are in furtherance of its exempt purpose and

31. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). Indeed, unlike most insiders, medical
staff members are not highly placed corporate leaders. Moreover, they are typically not even
employees of the hospitals for which they work; rather, they are almost always independent
contractors. The IRS has classified medical staff as insiders because their close working
relationship with the hospital puts them in a position to influence decision-making for their
own personal gain. Still, the classification of medical staff members as insiders is a
controversial issue. When Congress had the task of defining hospital insiders for the
purposes of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 ("TBOR2"), it took a narrower approach. TBOR2
authorized the IRS to impose a tax on excess benefit transactions (a form of inurement) that
occur between an exempt organization and a "disqualified person" (i.e. an insider). H.R.
REP. No. 104-506, at 58 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 1181. Congress limited
the definition of "disqualified persons" to those medical staff members who have been in a
position to "exercise substantial influence" over the affairs of an organization within the past
five years. H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 58 n.12. See generally Gerald M. Griffith, TBOR2
Compliance Plans: From Rebuttable Presumption to Enforcement, 34 J. HEALTH L. 567
(1997).
32. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862.
33. Colombo, supra note 15, at 5-43. See also Rev. Rul. 81-19, 1981-1 C.B. 353; Rev.
Rul. 78-41, 1978-1 C.B. 148; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-44-040 (Aug. 3, 2000); Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,830 (Aug. 24, 1990).
34. Colombo, supra note 15, at 5-43. See infra note 38 for further discussion of
"unrelated trade or business."
35. See, e.g., Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm'r, 30 F. 3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 1994)
(upholding determination that an HMO did not qualify for exemption under the integral part
doctrine, but suggesting circumstances under which it would qualify).
36. See supra note 34.
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insubstantial relative to its exempt activities. 37 Non-exempt activities may
subject a 501(c)(3) organization to the unrelated business income tax
(UBIT)-a levy on income from those activities that are not substantially
related to the organization's exempt purpose 3 8 -but otherwise, a 501(c)(3)
charity may generally conduct non-charitable activities without
jeopardizing its exempt status.
However, the IRS casts a wary eye on business partnerships between
charitable organizations and for-profit entities, particularly where the
charitable organization is a general partner and for-profit entities are limited
partners. 39 The IRS has long been concerned that where a charitable
organization serves as a general partner in a limited partnership it will have
fiduciary obligations to the limited partners that take precedence over, and
may conflict with, its own charitable obligations. 40 Although the IRS once
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). See also Colombo, supra note 15, at 5-32-33.
Whether an organization has a substantial nonexempt purpose is a question of fact to be
resolved on the basis of all the evidence presented in the administrative record. See supra
note 8.
38. Colombo, supra note 15, at 5-23-29. The I.R.C. imposes a tax, at corporate tax
rates, on the unrelated business taxable income of organizations exempt under section
501(c). IRS regulations provide that income is subject to UBIT if (1) it is income from a
trade or business; (2) such trade or business is regularly carried on by the organization; and
(3) the conduct of such trade or business is not substantially related to the organization's
performance of its exempt function. I.R.C. §§ 511(a)(1), 512(a)(2), 513(a) (West 2000);
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.513-1(a), (b), (c)(1), (d)(2) (2003). Congress excluded from UBIT
treatment certain types of passive income such as interest, dividends, rents, royalties, capital
gains, and other traditional methods for earning income from a charitable endowment
(although when passive income is collected from the taxable subsidiary of an exempt parent,
or when income of an exempt corporation is debt-financed, it will be taxed as UBIT). I.R.C.
§ 512(b). This exclusion reflects the basic rationale underlying the UBIT, namely to limit
the otherwise unfair competitive advantage that exempt organizations would have over forprofit entities if they were permitted to operate businesses without having to paying tax on
the income earned from those businesses. Colombo, supranote 15, at 5-29-39.
39. Colombo, supra note 6, at 509-12; Korman & Balsam, supra note 1, at 442-44. The
IRS generally adheres to an aggregate theory of partnership taxation that attributes to the
partners the activities of a partnership. Thus, for an exempt organization involved in a
partnership, the activities of the partnership have a direct bearing on its tax-exempt status. In
the case of an organization whose sole purpose or primary activity is participation in a
partnership (as in the case of a whole hospital joint venture, see infra Section III.A.), the IRS
will view that organization's activities as the same as those of the partnership. Id.
40. See Korman & Balsam, supra note 1, at 442-44; Colombo, supra note 6, at 511. The
IRS's central concern is that such conflicts may expose charitable assets to unlimited
liability for the benefit of the limited partners. Korman & Balsam, supra note 1, at 442-43.
Accordingly, some practitioners suggest that exempt organizations are on safer ground, from
a tax standpoint, if they participate solely as limited partners, in which case their role is that
of passive investor. MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2d ed. 2000). As such, their exposure is limited to their investment and
they do not have a duty, statutory or otherwise, to maximize profits for the investors. Id.
However, this guidance would appear to hold only where the exempt organization
contributes something less than a substantial portion of its assets to the limited partnership.
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41
treated these partnerships as prohibited per se under section 501(c)(3),
such arrangements are now permissible if they satisfy a two-prong test that
the IRS adopted in 1983.42 The first prong requires that the entity seeking
exemption serve a charitable purpose,4 3 and the second requires that the
arrangement be structured so that it "permits the exempt entity to act
exclusively in furtherance of the purposes for which exemption may be
44
granted and not for the benefit of the limited partners."

III. HOSPITAL JOINT VENTURES
A. Types of HospitalJoint Ventures
Joint ventures between tax-exempt hospital providers and for-profit
companies are of two primary types: ancillary joint ventures and whole
hospital joint ventures. 45 Ancillary joint ventures (AJVs) are common
46
arrangements that have existed for many years in the hospital industry.
Id. at 11-12. See also Korman & Balsam, supra note 1, at 443.
41. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,293 (May 30, 1975).
42. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983). Even before this memorandum, the IRS
had begun to reconsider its position on partnerships between a tax-exempt organization as
general partner and a for-profit entity as limited partner. See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,852
(Feb. 15, 1979) (determining that an entity's non-profit status was not jeopardized by an
arrangement with a for-profit pharmaceutical company). Then came Plumstead Theatre
Soc'y, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324, 1334 (1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1982), a
key case in which the Tax Court ruled in favor of a tax-exempt organization's participation
in a partnership where it was a general partner and for-profit entities served as limited
partners. The Tax Court concluded that the partnership obligations of the exempt
organization did not conflict with its tax-exempt status because (1) the exempt organization
did not have an obligation to return limited partners' capital contributions from its own
funds, (2) the limited partners did not have control over the exempt organization's activities,
and (3) none of the limited partners had any involvement with the exempt organization. Id.
Even before Plumstead, at least one court had already sanctioned an arrangement in which
an exempt entity contracted with a for-profit company to manage certain of the exempt
entity's business activities. See Broadway Theatre League of Lynchburg, Va., Inc. v. United
States, 293 F. Supp. 346, 355-56 (W.D. Va. 1968). The court upheld the arrangement
because the exempt organization retained ultimate authority over the assets and activities
being managed and the terms of the contract were reasonable. Id.
43. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005.
44. Id. This often requires determining whether the financial exposure of the exempt
organization is sufficiently limited, as through insurance or a limit on capital calls. Gerald
M. Griffith, Revenue Ruling 98-15: Dimming the Future ofAll Nonprofit Joint Ventures?, 20
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 405, 408 (1998).
45. Mary Jo Salins et al., Whole Hospital Joint Ventures, in IRS TAX EXEMPT &
GOVERNMENT

ENTITIES PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION GUIDE: TECHNOLOGY INSTRUCTION

PROGRAM, pt.I.A. at 1 (1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/topica.pdf
Colombo, supra note 6, at 513-15, 518-27.
46. STROMBERG & BOMAN, supra note 1, at 21-24 & Apps. (illustrating examples of

joint venture projects).
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They entail an agreement between an exempt hospital provider and a forprofit entity to conduct a specific business activity, such as a diagnostic
imaging center or ambulatory surgical center.47 Many of these ventures are
so-called hospital-physician joint ventures, formed between an exempt
hospital provider and a local for-profit entity owned by members of the
hospital's medical staff.48 Ancillary joint ventures are also formed between
exempt hospital providers and much larger for-profit entities, often regional
or national companies that specialize in outpatient diagnostic or surgical
services.49
Ancillary joint ventures are typically structured as partnerships or limited
liability companies (LLC). 50 The exempt hospital provider typically
transfers assets or contributes cash to the joint venture, while the for-profit
entity contributes cash.51 The exempt provider and for-profit partner
negotiate ownership interests in the venture, which may or may not be
proportional to their respective capital contributions.
The joint venture
owns and operates the facility or service it provides and the exempt hospital
47. Id. at 30-32. See also Satins et al., supra note 45, pt. I.A. at 9-10.
48. Korman & Gaske, supra note 28, at 781-82. See also William Grete, IRS Issues
Whole HospitalJoint Venture Ruling, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1998, at B 11; Mary Chris Jaklevic,
A Deal That's Hard to Refuse, MOD. HEALTHCARE , Dec. 3, 2001, at 4-5. Some hospitalphysician joint ventures are formed to pursue managed care contracts, an arrangement
known as a physician-hospital organization, or PHO. Peter R. Kongstvedt et al., Integrated
Health Care Delivery Systems, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 31 (Peter R.
Kongstvedt ed., 4th ed. 2001).
49. Korman & Gaske, supra note 28, at 781-82; Deanna Bellandi & Mary Chris
Jaklevic, What Gain Sharing?, MOD. HEALTHCARE 8, July 26, 1999, at 8.
50. The exempt hospital provider may serve as a partner in a general partnership or as
either a general partner or limited partner in a limited partnership. Satins et al., supra note
45, at 4, 5; Korman & Gaske, supra note 28, at 782. An exempt provider may also serve as a
member in a LLC. Satins et al., supra note 45, at 4. An LLC is an attractive legal structure
for exempt hospital providers involved in joint ventures because, in contrast to a general
partner in a partnership, an LLC member does not have personal liability for entity-level
debts. Id. Thus, some practitioners see the LLC structure as a means to address IRS
concerns about exempt organizations participating in partnership arrangements as a general
partner. See Korman & Gaske, supra note 28, at 782. An LLC structure eliminates personal
liability for entity-level debt but still provides all members with an opportunity to participate
in management (which is not allowed to limited partners) and can obtain the pass-through
tax treatment of a partnership. Id. LLCs can be formed under state law in all fifty states and
the District of Columbia. Satins et al., supra note 45, at 4. For an LLC, the articles of
organization and the operating agreement are the primary governing instruments. Id. The
operating agreement typically defines the operating rules of the organization and the
relationship of the members to one another and, as such, is similar to a partnership
agreement. Id. In most states an LLC must have two or more members. Id. See generally
Michael I. Sanders, Exempt OrganizationsInvesting Through Limited Liability Companies,
14 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 91, 92-99 (1996).
51. Satins et al., supra note 45, at 9-10.
52. Id.
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53
provider retains ownership and management of the hospital.
By contrast, a whole hospital joint venture (WHJV) is an arrangement
54
that involves not just one specialized facility, but an entire hospital.
Specifically, a WHJV is a transaction between an exempt hospital provider
and a for-profit entity where one of the two parties, more often the exempt
organization, 55 contributes a hospital, and'the other contributes funds and
other assets. 56 An operating agreement formalizes such matters as
ownership interests, governance and control of the venture, and income
distributions.57 The joint venture owns and operates the hospital and, as
such, the exempt provider's sole purpose may then be its participation in the
venture. 58 Like AJVs, WHJVs may be formed as either partnerships or
59

LLCs.

One other joint venture structure worth noting is the so-called hospital
6°
subsidiary joint venture, a hybrid of a WHJV and an AJV. In the hospital
subsidiary arrangement, the exempt provider creates a wholly-owned
subsidiary for the sole purpose of participating in a joint venture with a forprofit entity. Unlike the WHJV, the exempt provider does not directly
61
participate in the venture but does control the participating subsidiary.
The subsidiary contributes cash to the joint venture equal to the value of the
assets transferred by the for-profit entity, or is assigned the joint venture
interest of its exempt parent. The for-profit entity contributes a healthcare
53. Id.
54. Id. See also JAMES R. SCHWARTZ & H. CHESTER HORN, HEALTH CARE ALLIANCES
AND CONVERSIONS 83-89 (1999).
55. SCHWARTZ & HORN, supra note 54, at 83. Though in some cases, it is the for-profit
entity that owns and contributes the hospital. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-08-034 (Nov. 30,
1992); Korman & Gaske, supra note 28, at 785.
56. See supra note 50. Typically, in a WHJV, where the non-profit entity contributes a
hospital-an asset of substantial value-the for-profit partner will contribute an amount of
cash sufficient to equalize, or nearly equalize, the parties' investments in the joint venture.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Another possible arrangement is a joint operating agreement (JOA). In a JOA, two
or more organizations agree contractually to operate a hospital, allocating among themselves
discrete areas of operational responsibility as well as participation in the hospital's financial
gains and losses. Unlike WHJVs, JOAs involve no change in asset ownership for the
purpose of forming a third entity. Joint operating agreements have been the focus of a
number of IRS private letter rulings addressing, inter alia, whether the entity formed to
implement the JOA qualifies for tax exemption under the integral part doctrine. See, e.g.,
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-38-039 (June 26, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-08-045 (Nov. 29, 2000). See
also Korman & Gaske, supra note 28, at 783; Roderick Darling & Marvin Friedlander,
Virtual Mergers: Hospital Joint Operating Agreement Affiliations, in IRS TAX EXEMPT &
GOVERNMENT
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PROGRAM pt.J (1999), availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/topic-j.pdf.
60. Salins et al., supra note 45, at 7-8. See also infra Section IV.B.
61. Salins et al., supra note 45, at 7-8.
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facility or service program, such as an ambulatory surgery center or
physical therapy center.62 The subsidiary generally seeks to be recognized
as exempt under section 501(c)(3).63
B. Prevalenceof andMotivationfor HospitalJoint Ventures
The number of tax-exempt hospital providers forming joint ventures with
for-profit entities appears to have increased substantially during the last
twenty years, although precisely by how much is not known.64 Whole
hospital joint ventures were rarely seen before the 1990s and are today still
much less common than AJVs. However, one recent estimate is that more
than fifty WHJVs were in existence as of 2001,65 some involving prominent
players in the U.S. healthcare industry, including the country's largest forprofit hospital company, HCA, 66 and several high-profile academic medical
centers, including Tulane University Hospital 67 and The George
Washington University Medical Center.68
Ancillary joint ventures have likewise become more numerous in recent
years, although the AJV concept has been in existence longer than the
WHJV, and thus has had more time to gain acceptance. The U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study of hospital-physician joint
ventures and reported that the number of AJVs had more than doubled
during the 1980s, from approximately 200 to over 450.69 The GAO
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Neither of the two major hospital associations (the American Hospital Association
and the Federation of American Hospitals) tracks the numbers of ventures, Mark Taylor,
Joint Ventures Win the Draw, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 17, 2002, at 8, and the small amount
of commercially available data on hospital joint ventures is of unknown reliability.
65. Id.
66. Scott Hall, Largest For-profitHospital Chains Set Poor Example, DAILY JOURNAL,
Nov. 29-30, 2003, availableat http://www.thejournalnet.com. HCA was formerly known as
Columbia/ HCA Healthcare Corp.
67. Gina Rollins, Post-Mortem on the Tulane-Columbia Partnership, EXECUTIVE
SOLUTIONS FOR HEALTHCARE MGMT., June 1999, at 1. See also David Blumenthal & Joel S.

Weissman, Selling Teaching Hospitals to Investor-Owned Hospital Chains: Three Case
Studies, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 159.

68. Jonathan Gardner, Change on Horizon for D.C. Hospitals: Entrance of For-Profit
Universal and Coming of Managed Care Set Stage for Merger-and-Acquisition Frenzy in
Washington, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 22, 1997, at 56. See also Blumenthal & Weissman,

supra note 67, at 159.
69.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), PUB. No. GAO/HRD-93-124, NONPROFIT

HOSPITALS: FOR-PROFIT VENTURES POSE ACCESS AND CAPACITY PROBLEMS 4 (July 1993),
availableat http://www.gao.gov. Hospital-physician joint ventures also raise concerns about
physicians referring patients to entities in which they or their family members have a
financial interest. This concern led Congress to enact the Stark amendment as part of the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989, which took effect January 1, 1992. The so-called
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estimated that as of 1991 about eighteen percent of nonprofit hospitals were
7°
participating in for-profit joint ventures with physicians. When one adds
to this the number of AJVs between exempt hospital providers and other
(non-physician-owned) for-profit entities, the total number of AJVs may
well be in the thousands.7'
Underlying the increasing popularity of hospital joint ventures is the
reimbursement and competitive pressures in the hospital industry. During
the 1990s, hospitals experienced substantial declines in reimbursement rates
for inpatient care services. This dramatic shift in the economics of
healthcare was driven primarily by the increasing prevalence and
dominance of managed care organizations, namely health maintenance73
(PPOs),
72
organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations
74
insurance market.
which substantially increased their share of the health
These insurance entities provide health services to their enrollees by
negotiating with healthcare providers for price discounts--discounts that
Another factor driving down
cut into hospitals' profit margins.75
reimbursement rates was political; in 1997 Congress enacted legislation that
Stark law prohibited physicians from referring Medicare beneficiaries for clinical laboratory
services to entities in which they or members of their immediate family had a financial
interest. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6204, 103 Stat.
2106 (1989). In 1993, in "Stark 11"(which took effect in 1995) Congress expanded this selfreferral prohibition to other healthcare services, as well as to Medicaid beneficiaries. See
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13,562, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. V 1993). See
also Amy L. Woodhall, Integrated Delivery Systems: Reforming the Conflicts Among
Federal Referral, Tax Exemption, and Antitrust Laws, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 181, 187-95
(1995).
70. GAO, supra note 69, at 4.
71. Taylor, supra note 64, at 8.
72. It has become increasingly difficult to define the term "HMO" because of the wide
variety of arrangements that HMOs have come to encompass. According to Kongstvedt,
"HMO" can be used to describe either of two distinct types of managed healthcare plan: "a
licensed health plan that places at least some its providers at risk for medical expenses" (the
conventional HMO), or "a health plan that uses designated (usually primary care) physicians
as gatekeepers" to moderate the use of specialized medical care, like cardiology and surgery.
Peter R. Kongstvedt, Glossary of Terms and Acronyms, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH

CARE 842 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 4th ed. 2001).
73. A PPO is a health plan that contracts with independent providers for discounted
services. The number of providers is typically limited and the plan usually has a utilization
review system. Id. at 848.
74.

Peter D. Fox, An Overview of Managed Care, in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH

CARE 10 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 4th ed. 2001). Between 1988 and 1998 HMO market
share nationwide grew from eighteen percent (of insured individuals under age sixty-five) to
thirty percent, while PPO market share grew from eleven to thirty-four percent. During the
same period market share for indemnity (i.e., non-managed care) plans declined from
seventy-one percent to fourteen percent. Id.
75. David Dranove et al., Price and Concentration in Hospital Markets: The Switch
from Patient-Driven to Payer-Driven Competition,36 J.L. & EcON. 179, 180 (1993).
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reduced Medicare payments to hospitals for inpatient care. 76 At the same
time, hospitals were, and have been, facing increasing competition from
for-profit medical providers that capitalize on new technologies to
specialize in certain, particularly marketable, outpatient diagnostic and
surgical procedures.77 In many cases these companies, such as diagnostic
imaging centers and ambulatory surgical centers, are formed by members of
a hospital's own medical staff.78 Physicians form these companies
independently of the hospital and thus set themselves up to compete with
the hospital for patient care revenues.79
In light of these reimbursement and competitive pressures, tax-exempt
hospital providers have been pursuing both WHJVs and AJVs. Whole
hospitals joint ventures are attractive because they offer exempt providers
some of the advantages of being a part of a large national hospital company,
specifically greater bargaining leverage with suppliers, better access to
financial capital, and stronger expertise in operational and financial
management. 80 As well, because a WHJV is not a full-asset acquisition, it
allows a nonprofit, tax-exempt provider to reduce its investment in
healthcare operations while retaining a financial stake and some governance
role in the hospital.8 1 For-profit companies have a similarly strong
incentive to participate in WHJVs, namely to gain a foothold in provider
networks with a smaller financial investment than would be required if they

76. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4401-54, 111 Stat. 251
(1997). In subsequent legislation, Congress slowed or reversed some of these some of these
cuts. See, e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 101, 112, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999); Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP
Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, 106 Pub. L. No. 554, §§ 301-15, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000). See generally MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY

(2001), available at http://www.medpac.gov/

publications/congressional reports/Mar0l %20Entire%20report.pdf.
77. Jaklevic, supra note 48, at 4; William J. Lynk & Carina S. Longley, The Effect of
Physician-Owned Surgicenters on Hospital Outpatient Surgery, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug.
2002, at 215.
78. See supra note 77.
79. Id.
80. See Chris Serb, Money for Mission, Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Apr. 20, 1998, at
57; Salins et al., supra note 45, at 3-4. Some of the literature on multi-hospital systems
challenges the idea that hospitals can benefit by joining a national hospital system through a
WHJV. Indeed, two recent studies yielded ambiguous results as to whether and to what
degree hospitals can gain efficiencies through system affiliation. David Dranove et al., Are
MultihospitalSystems More Efficient?, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1996, at 100; Kathleen Carey,
Hospital Cost Efficiency and System Membership, INQUIRY, Spring 2003, at 25. But see
Terri J. Menke, The Effect of Chain Membership on Hospital Costs, 32 HEALTH SERV.
RESEARCH 177, 191-93 (1997) (finding that multi-hospital chains are more efficient than
independents, but that for-profit hospitals are no more efficient than not-for-profits).
81. SCHWARTZ& HORN, supra note 54, at 53.
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82

had to engage in a full-asset acquisition. Indeed, by making a relatively
modest financial contribution to a WHJV-an amount equal to as little as
half the value of the hospital-the for-profit partner can sometimes acquire
83
effective control of the hospital, particularly of its governance.
Ancillary joint ventures are a good alternative because they offer taxexempt hospital providers the prospect of an important additional source of
84 Because taxrevenue outside the maturing market of inpatient care.
exempt hospitals often form AJVs with members of their own medical staff,
the venture provides the hospital with a means for collaborating, rather than
competing, with its own physicians.85 This helps the hospital forge a bond
with its physicians that can translate into greater loyalty and thus more
admissions from those physicians. 86 In addition, entering into a physicianhospital organization (PHO), a particular type of AJN that was noted
previously, 87 typically helps a hospital strengthen its negotiating position
with insurance plans.8 8 Furthermore, by forming an AJN with a for-profit
entity that already specializes in providing the type of diagnostic or surgical
services the AV is formed to provide, a tax-exempt provider gains access
to expertise in managing the delivery of a lucrative service in an efficient
and effective manner.89 If the for-profit entity contributes financial capital
to the AJV, the tax-exempt provider also gets the benefit of spreading its
own financial risk. 90

82. Id.
83. Id. Analysts have suggested that for-profit entities have been able to use such
ventures to enhance their attractiveness to investors, since, under existing financial reporting
standards, even if the for-profit entity owns only half of the venture's equity, it can list all of
its assets on its balance sheet. Gregory A. Petroff, Whole Hospital Joint Ventures: The IRS
Position on Control,21 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 19, 27 (1998).

84. See Jaklevic, supra note 48, at 4; Claudia Kocher et al., Physician-Hospital
Integration Strategies: Impact of Physician Involvement in Hospital Governance, HEALTH
CARE MGMT. REv., Summer 1998, at 38-39.
85. See supra note 84.
86. See id. See also James B. Goes & ChunLiu Zhan, The Effects of Hospital-Physician
Integration Strategies on Hospital FinancialPerformance, 30 HEALTH SERV. REs. 507, 511

(1995) (providing an empirical assessment of hospital-physician integration strategies on
hospital performance).
87. See supra note 48.
88. Kongstvedt et al., supra note 48, at 41-44. The authors correctly note that while the
PHO offers few demonstrable advantages as a business entity it is an effective mechanism by
which hospitals can develop stronger relations with their medical staff members. Id.
89. See Jaklevic, supra note 48, at 4.
90. See id
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IV. REGULATORY AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS PERTAINING
TO HOSPITAL-BASED JOINT VENTURES

As the number of joint ventures between tax-exempt hospital providers
and for-profit organizations increased during the 1990s, the IRS began to
confront complex questions about the tax implications of such arrangements
for the exempt entity (or for an entity petitioning for exempt status). 91
Although the IRS issued a number of private letter rulings favoring these
arrangements,9 2 the rulings were inconsistent in defining the circumstances
under which a tax-exempt hospital provider may participate in a WHJV
without jeopardizing its exempt status.93 As a result, practitioners requested
further guidance from the IRS as to the tax implications of these
arrangements.94
A. IRS Revenue Ruling 98-15
In 1998 the IRS issued a revenue ruling addressing the question of
whether a tax-exempt hospital provider may retain its exempt status when
participating in a WHJV. 95 The IRS adopted the position that the taxexempt provider, to maintain its exemption, must have overall operational
control of the venture.96 The IRS illustrated its position with two distinct
scenarios, the first in which the tax-exempt provider maintains its
97
exemption, the second in which it does not.
The premise of both scenarios is a tax-exempt hospital provider that
decides it needs additional funding to serve its community and, together
with a for-profit company, forms a WHJV that is a limited liability
company (LLC). The exempt provider and the for-profit entity each receive
an ownership interest in the venture proportional to its capital contribution.
Pursuant to the operating agreement, all returns of capital and distributions
of earnings are to be proportional to the respective ownership interests. 98

91. See Griffith, supra note 44, at 405.
92. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-17-029 (Jan. 27, 1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-18-033 (Feb. 8,
1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-08-034 (Nov. 30, 1992). None of these rulings focuses on the
degree of control that the exempt provider must have to preserve its exempt status in a
situation where it has committed a substantial portion of its assets to a joint venture with a
for-profit entity.
93. See supra note 91. See also Ernst & Young LLP, Ernst & Young Comments on
Whole-Hospital Joint Venture Issues, 16 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 297, 299-300 (1997).
94. Ernst & Young, supra note 93, at 300. By contrast to a private letter ruling, a
revenue ruling has the binding authority of a regulation.
95. Rev. Rul. 98-15, supra note 7.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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The key elements that distinguish the two scenarios, and which illustrate
the IRS's concern that the control and direction of the joint venture properly
reflect the participation of a tax-exempt entity, are mission, governance, and
management. As to mission, in the first scenario, the venture is required by
its governing instruments to operate its hospital "in a manner that furthers
charitable purposes by promoting health for a broad cross-section of its
community." 99 The governing instruments further impose a duty on board
members to operate the venture for such charitable purposes instead of for
the financial benefit of the for-profit owners. 100 In the second scenario, by
contrast, the governing instruments do not give priority to the exempt
provider's charitable purposes.°10
As to governance, in the first scenario, the exempt provider controls
three of five seats on the governing board, while in the second, the exempt
provider controls the same number of seats as the for-profit participant. 10 2
In both scenarios, the governing board has authority over major decisions,
including approval of operating and capital budgets. However, only in the
first, "exempt," scenario is the for-profit owner's receipt of distributions
effectively controlled by the tax-exempt provider, and hence made
subordinate to the exempt provider's charitable mandate.'0 3
Finally, as to management, in the first scenario, the joint venture
contracts with an unrelated third party to manage the hospital. 10 4 In the
second, the venture contracts with a wholly-owned subsidiary of the forprofit partner. 105
In setting forth its position requiring operational control, the IRS relied
on much the same case law underlying the two-pronged test for partnerships
between exempt and for-profit entities announced in General Counsel
Memorandum 39,005.106 At the same time, the Service introduced a new
approach to analyzing whether the exempt provider meets the test by
focusing on facts and circumstances regarding the exempt provider's
control over the venture.'0 7 Under this approach, if the exempt provider
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Rev. Rul. 98-15, supra note 7.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. In scenario one, the term of contract is for five years and is renewable for
additional five-year periods by mutual consent between the parties involved in the venture.
In scenario two, the contract is also for five years and is renewable for five-year periods but
renewal is subject to the discretion of the management company.
105. Id.
106. Id. See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005, supra note 42.
107. Rev. Rul. 98-15, supra note 7. See discussion infra Section IVA. for a critical
appraisal of the Service's approach in this Ruling. See generally Griffith, supra note 44
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maintains operational control of the venture, it can ensure that benefit to the
for-profit partner will remain incidental to the venture's charitable
objectives, and thus satisfy the stringent requirements of the private benefit
doctrine.
Thus, the IRS held that the tax-exempt provider in scenario one meets
the two-prong test because its governing instruments require charitable
activity to be a priority and give the exempt provider a voting majority on
the governing board and hence control over operational decisions.10 8 By
contrast, the exempt provider in the second scenario does not meet the test
and, accordingly, is no longer organized and operated exclusively for a
charitable purpose. 0 9 The critical factors in this regard were the absence of
a binding obligation to give priority to charitable activity, the sharing of
control by the exempt provider and the for-profit entity, and the
management of the venture by a subsidiary of the for-profit entity. 1 °
Further disqualifying the venture in the second scenario is the fact that the
exempt provider will not be able to initiate community health programs, in
keeping with its mission, without the agreement of at least one board
member representing the for-profit entity."'
Revenue Ruling 98-15 was very controversial. Although practitioners
and commentators appreciated the guidance offered by the ruling, some
practitioners representing exempt hospital providers raised concerns about
the IRS position on control.1 2 Commentators questioned the legal basis for
the IRS position, particularly the Service's apparent focus on the exempt
provider's voting position on the venture's governing board." 3
(discussing the legal considerations underlying the nexus between the two-prong test and
IRS Revenue Ruling 98-15).
108. Rev. Rul. 98-15, supra note 7.
109. Id.
110. Id. The IRS concluded, unsurprisingly, that a conflict of interest existed because
the management company is a subsidiary of the for-profit partner and the executives
responsible for overseeing the joint venture have a pre-existing relationship with the forprofit partner.
111. Id. This initiation requirement appears to be at the heart of the control requirement,
and thus appears to be the basis for the Service's decision to reject shared-control
arrangements between exempt providers and for-profit entities. See discussion infra Section
IV.A.
112. See Carolyn D. Wright & Fred Stokeld, Joint Venture Revenue Ruling Gets High
Marks with Some Reservation, 78 TAx NOTES 1220, 1220 (1998); Korman & Balsam, supra
note 1, at 448; Griffith supra note 44, at 409-11.
113. Wright & Stokeld, supra note 112, at 1222; Korman & Balsam, supra note 1, at
448; Griffith supra note 44, at 409-11. While the IRS did not require explicitly that the
exempt entity have numerical control of the board, several commentators noted that the tone
of the ruling suggests that the issue of board control would be very important to the IRS in
assessing the exempt status of the hospital provider. See Douglas M. Mancino, New Ruling
Provides Guidance, Raises Questionsfor Joint Ventures Involving Exempt Organizations,88
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Commentators also complained that the two scenarios presented ventures at
extreme ends of the spectrum in terms of their stated commitment to
charitable activity, thus leaving open important questions about the many
arrangements that fall somewhere in the middle. 1 4 Further, commentators
suggested that while the focus of the revenue ruling was clearly on WHJVs,
the IRS's analytic framework has implications for AJVs, as well, raising
concerns about whether an exempt provider's participation with a for-profit
it lacks operational control could threaten the
entity in an AJV in which
15
status.'
provider's exempt
B. Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner
The first judicial test of the IRS position on WHJVs came a year after
Revenue Ruling 98-15, in Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner, in
which the Tax Court essentially affirmed the IRS's position.11 6 The
petitioner, Redlands Surgical Services ("Redlands Surgical"), was a
nonprofit subsidiary of a tax-exempt corporation called Redlands Health
Systems ("Redlands Health"). 1 7 Redlands Health's primary endeavor was
its ownership of Redlands Hospital, a well-established, nonprofit hospital
that had served its community since 1929. In 1990, in light of the hospital's
need for greater outpatient surgical capacity and the effects of competition
from a nearby freestanding surgical center (owned in limited partnership by
several Redlands Hospital physicians), Redlands Health entered into an
arrangement with a for-profit healthcare services company (SCA) to acquire
the surgical center. Redlands Health formed Redlands Surgical as a
nonprofit subsidiary which became a general partner with the for-profit
J. TAX'N 294, 294-95 (1998). A related point raised by some commentators concerned the
legal structure of the WHJVs presented in the ruling. Prior to the ruling, some tax attorneys
believed that the IRS would look more favorably on the use of a limited liability company
than a partnership, since an LLC would provide participants the protection of limited liability
and would give the exempt entity an opportunity to participate in the management of the
venture without assuming fiduciary duties to other participants. Id. Indeed, the IRS had
previously expressed concerns precisely about exempt entities' fiduciary obligations in
limited partnerships with for-profit entities. However, in Revenue Ruling 98-15, the IRS
made no issue of the partnership/LLC dichotomy, presenting both joint ventures as LLCs
(and thus making no point of identifying one business form as preferable to another). Id.
See also supra Section II.B. for a parallel analysis of limited versus general partnerships.
114. See, e.g., Wright & Stokeld, supra note 112, at 1222.
115. Michael W. Peregrine & T.J. Sullivan, Rev. Rul. 98-15 Confirms Traditional Tax
PlanningApproach for 'Typical' Joint Ventures, 20 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 220, 220-21
(1998) (noting that the analytic framework presented in the ruling is generally consistent
with the controlling case law governing the exemption aspects of all joint ventures between
exempt and for-profit entities); Kristen Hallam, IRS May Broaden Ruling, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Mar. 30, 1998, at 28; Griffith, supra note 44, at 405.
116. 113 T.C. 47, 92 (1999), aft'd,242 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001).
117. Id.at48-49.
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SCA, which partnership acquired control and became the general
(operating) partner of the surgical center, sharing ownership with the
limited partner physicians.' 18 Thus, the arrangement fit the definition of a
hospital subsidiary joint venture. 1 9 Redlands Surgical shared control of the
general partnership with the for-profit entity, SCA,120 and it effectively held
a twenty-seven percent interest in the profits of the operating partnership. 2 '
The case came before the Tax Court following the IRS's denial of
exempt status to Redlands Surgical. 22 The Tax Court ruled in favor of the
IRS, adopting substantially the control analysis of Revenue Ruling 98-15.123
The court concluded that Redlands Surgical was not operated exclusively
for charitable purposes because it had ceded operational control of the
partnership to the for-profit partner and a management company affiliated
with the for-profit partner. 24 In its analysis, the court focused on whether
Redlands Surgical exercised either formal or informal control over the
venture. The court found that Redlands lacked formal control, given that it
(1) did not have a majority position on the venture's governing board, (2)
was subject to an arbitration agreement with the for-profit entity that did not
require community or charitable objectives to be taken into account in an
arbitration proceeding, and (3) was also subject to a long-term contract with
a management company that was owned by the for-profit partner and the
contract gave the management company broad authority over the
operational decisions of the venture. 125 The court likewise found that

118.

Id.
119. See supra Section II.A.
120. Id. at 79. Redlands Surgical and the for-profit participant each received fifty
percent of the board vote.
121. Redlands Surgical had rights to forty-six percent of the profits of its general
partnership with SCA (although it contributed thirty-seven percent of the equity), id. at 50,
and the general partnership had a fifty-nine percent interest in the surgical center, id. at 54;
thus, forty-six percent of fifty-nine percent equals twenty-seven percent.
122. Redlands Surgical Servs., 113 T.C. at 47. See also Redlands Surgical Services
Revised Denial Letter, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 213-27 (Apr. 1, 1996). The IRS denied
exemption to Redlands Surgical because it lacked the requisite control over the joint venture
to qualify as an exempt organization. Id. Following the analytic framework of Revenue
Ruling 98-15, the IRS determined that Redlands Surgical did not have the control necessary
to assure that its income and assets would be used to carry out its charitable purposes. Id.
As such, the IRS concluded that the arrangement violated the prohibition on private benefit
since the surgical center would be operated for the financial benefit of its investors,
including the for-profit management company. Id.
123. Compare Redlands Surgical Servs., 113 T.C. 47, 76-86 with Rev. Rul. 98-15, 19981 C.B. 718.
124. Redlands SurgicalServs., 113 T.C. at 92-93.
125. Id. at 79-84. The management contract was for a fifteen-year term, renewable at
will by the management company, terminable only for cause, and providing for fees based
on a percentage of gross revenues.
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Redlands Surgical lacked informal control of the venture. The court found,
based on a review of the administrative record, that Redlands Surgical
lacked the necessary "allegiance or loyalty of the [for-profit entity] or of the
limited partners to cause them to put charitable objectives ahead of their
own economic objectives."' 126 Furthermore, the court found that, even with
Redlands Surgical as a co-general partner, the surgical center venture
nor sufficiently undertook
neither sufficiently espoused a charitable purpose
127
charitable responsibility in the community.
Concluding that Redlands Surgical lacked either formal or informal
control, the Tax Court held that the arrangement conferred upon the forprofit partner private benefit that was more than incidental; thus, Redlands
Surgical did not qualify for tax-exempt status. 128 The court rejected
Redlands Surgical's contention that, under the operational test of section
501(c)(3), the question of partnership control should be disregarded in favor
of a conduct-in-fact analysis. 29 Redlands argued that, under such an
analysis, the venture satisfied the goals of section 501(c)(3), since, on one
hand, the surgical center was actively engaged in charitable activities, and
on the other, none130of Redlands Surgical's partnership income benefited
"private interests.'
However, the court sided with the IRS, finding that
Redlands Surgical had ceded sufficient control to its for-profit partner to
indicate a substantial nonexempt purpose, thereby disqualifying it from
501(c)(3) status. 131 Furthermore, the court noted, consistent with Revenue
Ruling 98-15,132 that the arrangement was inconsistent with tax-exempt
status because it did not permit Redlands Surgical to unilaterally respond to
changing community needs (as by having the surgical center offer different,
or more affordable, services); rather, Redlands was limited to the passive
role of merely vetoing proposed partnership actions that it deemed contrary
to its exempt status. 33 Finally, the court rejected Redlands Surgical's
argument that it qualified for exemption by virtue of being an integral part
of its exempt parent corporation (Redlands Health) and/or its exempt sister
hospital (Redlands Hospital). The court concluded that, however close its
relationship with its related entities might be, the surgical center venture
126.

Id. at 85.

127. Id. at 87. The court noted, for example, the surgical center's negligible provision
of care to low-income, state-subsidized patients.
128. Id. at 92-93.
129. Id. at 77.
130. Redlands Surgical Servs., 113 T.C. at 77-78. The court noted that the logical
extension of Redland's position would be that mere passive investment in a for-profit
healthcare enterprise would be a charitable activity, contrary to established precedent.
131. Id. at78.
132. See infra Section IV.A.
133. Redlands Surgical Servs., 113 T.C. at 79-80.
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was not furthering their charitable purposes. 134 The Tax Court's decision
denying exemption to Redlands Surgical was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in aper curiam opinion issued March 15, 2001.135
The Redlands decision provoked renewed debate over Revenue Ruling
98-15. Some commentators believed the Tax Court reached the right
decision for the wrong reasons, agreeing that Redlands Surgical did not
deserve exemption because it had a poor record of charity care and
community service, but arguing that the court's focus on operational control
was misplaced in light of the broader policies and principles underlying the
concept of tax-exempt status in healthcare.136 Others argued that the court
erred in disregarding the fact that the surgical center venture actually made
it possible for Redlands Hospital to provide more charity care and
community service. 137 In addition, commentators expressed concern that
the decision would raise additional questions about the scope of Revenue
38
Ruling 98-15 and its potential application to AJVs.1
C. St. David's Health Care System, Inc. v. United States
The IRS position on WHJVs was tested a second time in St. David's
Health Care System, Inc. v. United States.13 9 In St. David's, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a grant of summary judgment in favor of a
hospital provider challenging the IRS's revocation of its tax-exempt status
for participating in a WHJV with a for-profit entity. 140 In 1996, St. David's
Health Care System, a tax-exempt hospital provider, entered into a joint
venture relationship with a subsidiary of the for-profit hospital company
HCA. 14 1 St. David's and the HCA subsidiary were each ten percent general
partners in the venture. 142 Like the arrangement in Redlands, the
partnership agreement called for the tax-exempt provider and for-profit
134. Id. at 96-97.
135. Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 242 F. 3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001).
136. See, e.g., Darryl K. Jones, Private Benefit and the Unanswered Questions from
Redlands, 89 TAX NOTES, Oct. 2, 2000, at 121, 131-38 (arguing that the decision should have
rested on the ground that the venture resulted in charitable assets benefiting a select and
small group of private individuals).
137. See, e.g., Carolyn D. Wright, IRS Wins First Round in Redlands: Exemption
ProperlyDenied,25 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 189, 190 (1999).
138. Id.
139. Civ. No. A-01-CA-046 JN, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453 (W.D. Tex. June 7,
2002), vacated by 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003).
140. 349 F.3d at 244.
141. Id. at 233. As noted in note 66, supra, HCA was formerly known as
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.
142. St. David's, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at *4. The limited partners were St.
David's and another HCA subsidiary. Additional classes of limited partnerships were
reserved for acquisition by staff physicians and management investors at a later date.
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entity to have equal voting rights on the governing board. 143 However,
unlike Redlands, the partnership agreement in St. David's included several
provisions focusing on charitable conduct. These included a provision
stating that the partnership's operations would be conducted so as to satisfy
the community benefit standard of section 501(c)(3). 144 In addition, St.
David's had the right to unilaterally dissolve the joint
venture if the venture
45
failed to meet its commitments to the community.
Following a tax audit, in October 2000 the IRS revoked the tax-exempt
status of St. David's retroactive to the date of the formation of the WHJV 1in
47
1996.146 According to the IRS's Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM)
that was prepared after the audit, the revocation was based on a finding that
St. David's, in the context of the WHJV arrangement, was no longer
operating exclusively to further a charitable purpose. The IRS's analytical
framework for the audit, as presented in the TAM, focused on the exempt
provider's ability to control the partnership. 148 The IRS concluded that St.
David's lacked any direct control over the partnership because it did not
have a voting majority on the board. 149 The fact that St. David's had equal
voting rights enabled it to block proposals from HCA representatives but
did not allow it to "initiate changes to enhance charitable care in the
community."'' ° The lack of a voting majority for St. David's precluded the
board of the partnership from qualifying as a community board, which
meant that the venture failed to meet the community benefit standard set out
in Revenue Ruling 69-545.'
The IRS also concluded that St. David's lacked any indirect control over
the venture in light of two provisions in the partnership agreement. One
was a management services agreement, which, like the arrangement in
Redlands, provided for the management of the day-to-day operations of the
joint venture by a company that was affiliated with the for-profit

143. Id. at *19-20. Each party contributed various assets to the venture. St. David's
ownership interest in the venture was approximately forty-six percent and HCA's ownership
interest was approximately fifty-four percent. Id. at *4.
144. Id. at *20.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *4.
147. Tech. Adv. Mem., 2002 PRL LEXIS 2090 (Aug. 20, 2002).
148. St. David's, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at *57-64.
149. Id.at *59.
150. Id.at *57. The partnership agreement did provide for St. David's to appoint the
chairperson of the board, though the IRS did not consider this significant because the board
chairperson lacked the authority to break a tie between St. David's and HCA voting blocks.
Id. at *60.
151. Id. at *78. See infra Section II.A. for discussion of Rev. Rul. 69-545 and the
community benefit standard.
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participant. 52 The other was an employment agreement that provided that
all individuals working on behalf of the partnership, including former St.
David's executives, were to be employees of the HCA subsidiary serving as
general partner in the arrangement. 53 Finally, the IRS noted that the
partnership agreement did not explicitly give priority to charitable
54
objectives. 1
St. David's challenged the IRS decision to revoke its tax-exempt status in
a suit to recover the back taxes it had paid pursuant to the revocation, and
55
prevailed in the district court, winning a grant of summary judgment.
The court applied the analytical framework favored by the IRS and adopted
by the Tax Court in Redlands,'56 and framed the key issues as: (1) "is St.
David's operated exclusively for charity, meaning that only insubstantial
portions of its activities benefit private, non-exempt purposes?" and (2) "is
it operated for the community interest and not for a private interest,
157
specifically, HCA?'
In addressing the first issue, the court applied the community benefit
standard, focusing particularly on whether the venture was under the control
of a community board. 58 The court held that the St. David's board
qualified as a community board, notwithstanding that the for-profit partner
controlled the same number of votes as St. David's, because the partnership
agreement offered exceptional protections for St. David's exempt purposes,
including a provision that all hospital activities had to be conducted in
accord with the community benefit standard. 59
The District Court
explained that:
Voting strength is more than a numbers game, and the [partnership
152. Id. at *62-64. The IRS criticized the management services agreement as
unreasonable in duration (fifty-five years) and financial structure (the management company
would receive approximately six percent of the partnership's net revenues).
153. Id. at *64.
154. St. David's, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at *74-75. The IRS discounted the
provisions in the partnership agreement focusing on charitable conduct. One such provision
required the CEO of the hospital to calculate the amount of charity care the hospital provided
for each fiscal year and report the amount provided to the board. Id. at *75. However, the
IRS appeared to view these provisions as insubstantial juxtaposed to the absence of any
"express statement in the Agreement that establishes any obligation that charitable purposes
will take precedence over profit motives." Id. at *58.
155. Id.at *3.
156. Id. at *23.
157. Id. at *13.
158. Id. at *19-20. The court initially considered whether a community board was a
requirement under the community benefit test as articulated in Revenue Ruling 69-145. The
court concluded that "the presence of a community board is a point in favor of exemption but
not an absolute requirement for exemption." Id.at *16. See also infra Section IV.C.
159. St. David's, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at *20-21.
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agreement] provisions clearly protect the non-profit, charitable pursuits
as well as any community board could. The government seems focused
on majority control, but the law is more concerned with control,
or from a
regardless of whether
160 its control springs from a majority
corporate structure.
In approving the control arrangement, the court found salutary several
provisions in the partnership agreement, including St. David's right to
appoint the board chairperson, which the court said would give St. David's
much control over the board's agenda; St. David's authority to unilaterally
remove the CEO of the16partnership; and St. David's right to unilaterally
dissolve the partnership. 1
As to the question of private benefit, the court found that the structure of
the venture was protective of charitable purpose and thus concluded that St.
The court
David's operated exclusively for exempt purposes. 162
clearly
was
David's
St.
that
noting
its
facts,
on
Redlands
distinguished
pursuing charitable objectives, while the surgery center in Redlands
' 63
"operated no emergency room and provided no free care to indigents."'
On review, the Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment,
finding that the joint venture between St. David's and HCA presented
genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether St. David's met the
operational test for tax exemption. 164 The court focused its analysis on the
question of control, identifying the key inquiry as being whether St. David's
had ceded formal or effective control of the venture to its for-profit partner
such that more than an insubstantial amount of its activities were serving
non-charitable purposes. 165 The court examined several provisions in the
partnership agreement that St. David's contended assured it of control of
the joint venture, but the court was clearly unconvinced. 166 For example,
one provision purported to give St. David's authority to dissolve the joint
venture, but the court observed that the provision could only be rightfully
invoked if St. David's exempt status were determined by legal counsel to be
clearly jeopardized. 167 The court found such a qualified right to be
inconsistent with substantial control over the venture. The court further
160.
161.
dissolve
factor in
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. at *20. However, as discussed infra, the court of appeals found that the right to
the partnership, although unilateral, was impermissibly qualified, an important
the court's decision to reverse the district court. See infra Section IV.C.
Id.at *24.
Id. at*19.
St. David's, 349 F.3d at 244.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id. at 243-44.
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noted that, even if St. David's could rightfully exercise its right of
dissolution, it was unlikely ever to do so, given a non-compete clause that
prohibited either partner from operating after dissolution in Austin, Texas,
the primary service area for St. David's. 168 Thus, the court found the
purported control provision to be hollow as well as qualified, and thus not a
persuasive indicium of St. David's effective control of the joint venture.
The court also addressed the community benefit standard, agreeing with
the district court that a community board was not a sine qua non precondition for tax-exemption, 169 but also noting that St. David's lack of
majority control of the partnership board limited significantly its ability to
0
initiate charitable activities.17
The court concluded that St. David's had not met its burden in moving
for summary judgment and that there remained uncertainty whether St.
David's had ceded control to HCA. 17 1 Thus, the court vacated the grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case to the district court. 72
D. Future Outlookfor IRS Positionon HospitalJoint Ventures
Tax-exempt hospitals must now look to Redlands and St. David's for
insight as to what will satisfy the IRS's control requirement relative to joint
venture arrangements with for-profit entities. The two cases indicate that,
in WHJVs, the exempt provider must be in a position to control decisionmaking about the operation of the venture. It is unclear whether the
provider's control must be formalized. The IRS has advised that it is not
necessary for the exempt provider to have a voting majority on the board, 173
but the tone of Revenue Ruling 98-15 and the IRS's posture in Redlands

168.
169.
the joint
170.
171.
172.
satisfied

Id. at 244.
Id. at 236. But unlike the district court, the court of appeals did not rule on whether
venture's board, in fact, qualified as a community board.
St. David's, 349 F.3d at 241-42.
Id.
Id. On remand, a district court jury found for St. David's, finding that the hospital
the control test mandated by the Fifth Circuit. Don Kramer, Jury Finds St. David's

Hospital Has Enough Control to Retain Exemption, NONPROFIT LEADER, Apr. 2004,

availableat http://www.nonprofitleader.org/04_04/article6.html.
173. Bernadette Broccolo et al., IRS FY 2002 CPE Text Provides Valuable New
Healthcare Tax Guidance, HEALTH L. DIG., Nov. 2001, at 6. Also, within the last year, the
IRS recognized the tax-exemption of a health system subsidiary whose sole activity is
participating in ancillary joint ventures (as was the case in Redlands) and which shares board
control of some of the joint ventures (50/50) with for-profit entities. This was apparently a
hard fought victory for the health system involved in the case and is likely to represent an
exception to the Service's position on these types of joint ventures.
See Client
Memorandum, Gardner Carton & Douglas, IRS Recognizes Exemption for 50/50 Joint
Venture Partner (July 2003), available at www.gcd.com.
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and St. David's suggest otherwise.'74 What is clear, particularly in light of
the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in St. David's, is the vitality of the IRS's
approach to operational control. Indeed, not even the district court in St.
David's, ruling for the taxpayer, challenged the IRS's approach; its decision
focused more narrowly on how the IRS assessed evidence related to the
control requirement.
As to AJVs the situation is less clear. The IRS has sent conflicting
signals as to whether and how Revenue Ruling 98-15 would apply to
AJVs. 175 The concern for tax-exempt providers is two-fold: does the
operational control requirement apply to AJVs, and, if so, what are the
Some
consequences for failing to meet the control requirement?
commentators have argued that, even if the operational control requirement
does apply to AJVs, it should apply narrowly, only for the purposes of
determining whether the venture triggers UBIT. 176 Under such an
approach, the fact that an exempt provider lacks control of an AJV would
not endanger its exempt status, but would merely subject it to UBIT on its
income from the venture.
Of course, even under a more lenient approach, the IRS might still see fit
177
to challenge the exempt status of providers participating in AJVs.
Unfortunately, existing case law provides a meager basis for forecasting the
outcome of such challenges, since cases thus far have dealt primarily with
WHJVs. While Redlands may be at least somewhat instructive, since it
involved a venture that was not a whole-hospital, the Redlands venture was
also not a prototypical AJV in that the exempt provider was not engaged in
78
activities outside of the joint venture that supported its tax-exempt status.'
Thus, neither current case law, IRS private letter rulings, nor general
counsel memoranda offer tax-providers particularly helpful guidance on
AJVs involving for-profit entities.

174. Id. at 5-6.
175. See, e.g., Hallam, supra note 115, at 28; Carolyn Wright, Owens: Whole Hospital
JVRuling Has Value'for Other Charities,79 TAX NOTES 1102, 1102 (1998).
176. Commentators argue that a narrow approach is appropriate because a provider's
participation in an AJV is, by definition, ancillary to its other (exempt) activities, and
typically a relatively small part of its overall operations-precisely the factual situation
contemplated by Congress when it enacted the UBIT. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 6, at
526.
177. See discussion infra Section V.A. 1.
178. Some commentators, by contrast, argue that Redlands is precisely applicable to
AJVs because the joint venture in Redlands was, in fact, an AJV masquerading as a whole
hospital joint venture, given that it involved a hospital subsidiary rather than an entire
hospital. See Wright, supra note 137, at 190.
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V. ANALYSIS OF IRS POSITION ON HOSPITAL JOINT VENTURES

A. Legal Considerations
When the IRS issued its long-awaited Revenue Ruling 98-15, it gave
little indication that it was doing anything revolutionary, or even
evolutionary. Rather, it presented 98-15 as little more than a restatement of
well-settled tax law principles, 79 namely the two-prong charitable purpose
test and the community benefit standard first announced in Revenue Ruling
69-545.' 8° Whatever the intended descriptive or prescriptive reach may
have been for Revenue Ruling 98-15, it provides an apt occasion for reassessing its key underlying principles.
1. Revenue Ruling 98-15 and the Two-Prong Test
In its articulation of the two-prong test, Revenue Ruling 98-15 focused
primarily on the second prong, which requires that a joint venture between
an exempt provider and a for-profit entity be structured so that it does not
preclude the exempt hospital provider from acting exclusively in
furtherance of its exempt purpose. 18 1 The IRS requires the exempt provider
to have operational control of the joint venture to assure that the joint
venture will pursue solely the provider's charitable activities, and to assure
that the venture will not confer private benefit on the for-profit entity. The
exempt provider is said to have operational control if it is in a position to
initiate activities that promote the health of the community in a manner that
supports its charitable mission. As salutary as the concept and goals of the
operational control requirement may be, there is little legal justification for
it, with respect to either WHJVs or AJVs, and the IRS's insistence upon it
reveals a preference for form over substance in its treatment of joint
ventures between exempt hospitals and for-profit entities.
Consider, first, the WHJV. If, as is typical, the joint venture is to be the
only activity of the exempt provider (or petitioner for exemption), the IRS
must premise its grant or denial of exemption solely on the joint venture's
activities. 82 While this is consistent with the aggregate theory of
179. In keeping with its position that the ruling was merely a clarification of existing
law, the IRS chose to issue the ruling without a notice and comment period. Wright &
Stokeld, supra note 112, at 1222.
180. See discussion supra Section II.A.
181. Seesupranote4l.
182. Exempt providers in WHJVs usually are engaged in only one activityparticipating in the joint venture-but it is possible for the exempt provider to be engaged in
charitable activities other than hospital care. Under such circumstances, the exempt provider
may be able to retain its exemption regardless of the way in which the WHJV is structured.
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partnership taxation-whereby the activities of a partnership are attributed
to its partners 83 -it does not follow that a tax-exempt provider must have
operational control over joint ventures with for-profit entities. Indeed, the
IRS's emphasis on operational control is of recent vintage. Neither General
Counsel Memorandum 39,005, in which the IRS presented the two-prong
test, nor the case law cited by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 98-15, focuses on
operational control as an absolute requirement for joint venture
arrangements between tax-exempt and for-profit entities. While operational
control has been used by the Tax Court as a factor in determining an
organizations' eligibility for 501(c)(3) status, 184 it was only one of several
factors the court considered in determining whether a putatively charitable
entity would, in fact, serve charitable objectives.1 85 Thus, the two-prong
test need not be interpreted so narrowly as to require the exempt provider to
possess operational control of a WHJV. Indeed, the test should be applied
more flexibly to allow for the multitude of possible arrangements in which
the tax-exempt provider could act exclusively in furtherance of its
charitable purpose, which, in the context of healthcare, means that its
resources are being used primarily to promote the health of the community
in satisfaction of the community benefit standard.
For example, in the WHJV context, there are several alternatives to
operational control that would satisfy the policy concerns underlying the
two-prong test. The IRS could require that joint venture participants
formalize in the partnership's governing instruments commitments to
activities that promote the health of the community in accordance with the
community benefit standard. While participants are required under current
rules to commit generally to the principle of giving charitable goals priority
over financial goals, 86 new rules could require participants to set forth
specific measurable goals consistent with the community benefit standard,
and hold the participants accountable for meeting those goals. In this vein,
the participants might commit to providing emergency room services or a
specified amount of free medical care each year. The IRS could monitor
the joint venture's progress in accomplishing the goals and make the
183. See supra Section II.B.
184. Est of Hawaii v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 1067, 1079-80 (1979), aff'd in unpublished
opinion, 647 F.2d 170, 170 (9th Cir. 1981); Housing Pioneers, Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo
1993-120 (1993), aff'd, 49 F. 3d 1395, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995).
185. Est of Hawaii, 71 T.C. at 1079-80; Housing Pioneers, T.C. Memo 1993-120. In
both cases, the Tax Court appeared more concerned with the arrangements' vague
description of charitable objectives and poorly developed plans for charitable activities. For
example, in Housing Pioneers the Tax Court questioned the credibility of the petitioner's
claim that it would perform charitable activities by noting that it had made no attempt to
adopt any actual plan by which petitioner expected to implement its stated objectives.
186. Rev. Rul. 98-15, supra note 7.
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provider's tax exemption contingent on satisfactory progress toward those
goals. If the venture were to fail to meet its charitable obligations, the taxexempt provider would be required to withdraw from the arrangement by
exercising an escape clause in the governing instruments. Furthermore, the
exempt provider would risk losing its own exemption if it were unable to
document charitable activities outside of the joint venture. Such a focus on
measurable charitable goals is consistent with the district court's decision in
St. David's, which noted with such favor the charitable provisions in the
187
partnership agreement.
Of course, a rule requiring participants to commit contractually to
compliance with the community benefit standard is not the same as
mandating (as the IRS does currently) that the exempt provider have
initiation (i.e. unilateral) rights to pursue community needs. However,
while the IRS may believe that its current requirement of initiation rights is
an effective way to ensure that community needs are met, there exists no
basis in current tax law or regulation for such rights to be the sine qua non
for tax exemption for exempt hospital providers participating in WHJVs.
As noted by one commentator in his analysis of 98-15, "section 501(c)(3)
does not in any way prescribe exactly how an organization must conduct its
activities. Indeed, the absence of a power to initiate new activities through
the Uoint venture] is simply a speculative issue that should have no bearing
on this particular matter." 188
Still, even if initiation rights are considered central to the tax-exempt
status of a provider participating in a WHJV, it does not follow as a matter
of law that the exempt provider must have operational control over all joint
venture activities. Indeed, this requirement has the perverse effect of
eviscerating one of the key advantages of the healthcare joint venture. A
primary reason for which tax- exempt hospitals form joint ventures with
for-profit entities is to gain access to the managerial expertise of the forprofit company.189 However, the current rule prevents the for-profit partner
from having any control whatsoever over the venture, even where some
control may be desirable and result in the more efficient management of the
venture.
A more flexible rule would permit participants to negotiate an
arrangement that conferred on the tax-exempt provider initiation rights for
certain decisions, those directly related to charitable activities, while
allowing the for-profit partner more leverage in the general management of
the healthcare organization.
187.
188.

See discussion supra Section IV.C.
Mancino, supra note 113, at 298.

189. See supra Section III.B.
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Nor can a requirement for operational control be justified as a measure to
protect the assets of the tax-exempt provider. Certainly, the exempt
provider does place charitable assets at risk by participating in the venture.
But, as noted by Professor Colombo,' 90 this is the case whenever a taxexempt entity engages in commercial activities. Moreover, an important
distinction exists between control over the joint venture and control over the
tax-exempt provider. As long as the for-profit entity does not exercise
control over the exempt provider, the exempt provider can take steps to
minimize its financial exposure from the venture. The IRS appeared to
adopt this view in General Counsel Memorandum 39,005, which concurred
with a proposed private letter ruling favorable to an exempt entity
participating as one of two managing partners in a limited partnership that
planned to develop a housing project for low-income elderly and
handicapped individuals. 191 The Service did not consider whether the
exempt entity had more control over the venture than the other general
partner, a for-profit entity, but rather focused on the financial protections
afforded the exempt entity by the partnership instruments.' 92
As to the AJV, the operational control requirement has no clear legal
foundation whatsoever in either previous IRS rulings or case law. As long
as a substantial portion of the exempt provider's activities are fulfilling a
charitable purpose apart from the AJV, its tax-exempt status should not be
placed in jeopardy simply because it lacks control over the venture. Of
course, if the venture is controlled by members of the hospital's medical
staff, private inurement concerns may arise, since the IRS may chose to
view medical staff members as insiders.1 3 Even so, the exempt provider's
lack of operational control over the venture is not itself tantamount to
private inurement. Furthermore, while the exempt provider's degree of
control over the venture may be relevant to the question of whether the
venture is substantially related to the charitable mission of the hospital
provider, and thus whether its income is subject to UBIT, 194 it is only one of
several factors for consideration, since it does not by itself prove the nexus
195
between the venture and the exempt provider's charitable mission.

190. Colombo, supra note 6, at 526.
191. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005.
192. Id.
193. See supra Section H.A.
194. See supra Section I.B.
195. See Colombo, supra note 6, at 526 (arguing that any joint venture activity designed
to provide healthcare services would ostensibly be substantially related to the charitable
purpose of an exempt hospital provider).
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2. Revenue Ruling 98-15 and Community Benefit Standard
In St. David's, the IRS argued that the community benefit standard
requires a WHJV to have a community board and, by extension, that voting
6
rights on the board are an important indicator of control over the venture.1
While Revenue Ruling 69-545, which set out the community benefit
standard, did refer to a community board, the ruling did not refer explicitly
to such a board as a requirement for exemption. 97 Even the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in St. David's, reversing in favor of the IRS, concluded
that hospitals do not need to demonstrate every factor set out in Revenue
Ruling 69-545, including a community board.1 98 This view appears to have
been tacitly adopted by the IRS in the years since Revenue Ruling 69-145,
as evidenced by the Service's inaction as many hospitals have moved away
from a community board model. 99 Two trends in particular underlie the
movement among hospitals away from a community board, both of which
are responses to industry-wide reimbursement and competitive pressures. °°
First, many hospitals appear to have reconstituted their boards with
insiders-typically members of the hospital's medical staff and senior

196. St. David's, Civ. No. A-01-CA-046 JN, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10453, at *16
(W.D. Tex. June 7, 2002), vacated by 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003).
197. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
198. St. David's, 349 F.3d at 236. The IRS has stated that "a board of directors drawn
from the community" is a "significant factor" related to the community benefit test,
however, it did not refer to it as a necessary or determinative factor. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 19832 C.B. 94. Moreover, the IRS has never issued any guidance to hospitals as to a requisite
number or proportion of community representatives comprising the board. Mancino, supra
note 20, at 629; Gary J. Young, Insider Representation on the Governing Boards of
Nonprofit Hospitals: Trends and Implications for Charitable Care, 33 INQUIRY 352, 354
(1997).
199. The IRS has done little to resist this trend, either by clarifying the definition or
required composition of a community board or by revoking the exempt status of hospitals
whose boards no longer satisfy the community benefit standard. See Mancino, supra note
20, at 628-32. Where the IRS has moved to clarify board composition requirements,
particularly as to other types of tax-exempt healthcare organizations, it has taken a liberal
approach. In 1996 the IRS relaxed restrictions on physician participation on governing
boards of tax-exempt integrated delivery systems (IDS). Fred Stokeld, Exempt Health Care
Organizations Face Many Challenges, Sullivan Says, 16 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 186, 186
(1997). The IRS had previously required no more than twenty percent of the board to
consist of physicians. Id. The revised policy permits physicians to constitute a majority of
the board of an IDS as long as it is a controlled subsidiary of a community-controlled
organization and a conflict of interest policy is adopted by both the IDS and its parent. Id.
See also Bernadette Broccolo et al., The 97 Percent Solution: New Flexibilityfor Physician
BoardMembership, 15 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 247, 253 (1996).
200. These are the same pressures that have resulted in the increased prevalence of joint
ventures between tax-exempt hospitals and for-profit entities. See supra Section III.B. See
also Gary J. Young et al., Community Control and PricingPatternsof Nonprofit Hospitals:
An AntitrustAnalysis, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1051, 1051-52 (2000).
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management-rather than representatives of the community. 20 1 This trend
has occurred as some healthcare lawyers and consultants have advised
hospitals to increase insider representation in order to strengthen their
boards' capabilities in financial and operational planning.2 °2 Hospitals have
also been advised to reduce the size of their boards, which many appear to
have done as well.20 3 As a result, hospitals have fewer board seats available
for community representatives.2 °4
Second, a trend toward consolidation of hospitals into systems or chains
appears to have diminished the decision-making authority of hospital
boards. This has occurred because hospital systems, which developed in
order to gain negotiating leverage with insurance plans and to achieve
economies of scale,20 5 typically have corporate boards that make, or at least
have ultimate control over, operational decisions of member hospitals.
These corporate boards often have a regional or national orientation, rather
than a local one, and likely have few representatives from the communities
that member hospitals serve.20 6 As such, the formation and growth of
hospital systems has in many cases shifted the locus of hospital-level policy
making away from communities and toward corporate offices.
Notwithstanding this apparent shift among hospitals away from a
community board structure, the IRS now insists that in WHJV
arrangements, the exempt hospital provider either have a majority position
on the joint venture's board, or be in some comparably dominant position
201. Young, supra note 198, at 354. This trend was documented in one study that
examined insider representation among nonprofit hospitals in California from 1981 through
1991. Id. According to the study, in 1981 only twenty percent of hospitals had governing
boards on which more than one-third of the members had insider status as either senior
managers or medical staff (i.e. physicians). Id. By 1991, more than a third of hospitals had
boards with substantial insider representation. Id. This study is supported by a variety of
anecdotal reports suggesting the trend towards greater insider influence on hospital boards.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Shortell, New Directionsin Hospital Governance, 34 HosP.& HEALTH
SERV. ADMIN. 7, 17 (1989); Carol Molinari et al., Hospital Board Effectiveness:
Relationships Between Governing Board Composition and Hospital FinancialViability, 28
HEALTH SERV. RES., 269, 359-62 (1993); Carol Molinari et al., Does the Hospital Board
Need a Doctor?, 33 MEDICAL CARE 170, 171-75 (1995).

202. Young, supra note 198, at 354.
203. But see Jeffrey A. Alexander et al., Changes in the Structure, Composition, and
Activity of Hospital Governing Boards, 1989-1997: Evidence from Two NationalSurveys, 79
MILBANK Q. 253, 257-59 (2001) (noting that, while some argue that smaller boards result in
more efficient decision-making, this is not a consensus view, and if there has been a
movement to reduce board size, it has had very little noticeable impact to date).
204. Young, supra note 198, at 354.
205. As of the late 1990s, over thirty-five percent of tax-exempt hospitals were members
of systems. AM. HosP. ASS'N & ERNST & YOUNG LLP, 1997 HOSPITAL AND HEALTH
SYSTEM GOVERNANCE SURVEY: SHINING LIGHT ON YOUR BOARD'S PASSAGE TO THE FUTURE

28 (1997).
206. Id. at 1058-59.
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over the venture's operations. As a result, such tax-exempt providers need
to be more concerned about their degree of control over the venture than
how they themselves are controlled and governed. But therein lies the irony
of the rule; the exempt provider must have control over the venture but the
exempt provider's own governance arrangement may be devoid of the
necessary control to ensure that charitable activities are given highest
priority. In any event, the IRS's own actions (or inactions) are directly
contrary to the conclusion that Revenue Ruling 98-15 is nothing more than
a corollary of the community benefit standard.
B. Policy Considerations
In the foregoing section, it is argued that there is little or no legal
justification for Revenue Ruling 98-15's focus on operational control. It
would be far more consistent with the statutory and regulatory policies that
Revenue Ruling 98-15 was intended to further for the IRS to evaluate
WHJVs, and some AJVs, under the community benefit standard, using
operational control as one, non-dispositive factor in the analysis.
Furthermore, in shifting its focus back to the community benefit standard,
the IRS would have the opportunity to re-affirm the importance of the
community board and attach greater weight to it in assessing a joint
venture's compliance with the standard. In this sense, the IRS might
consider operational control as but one policy-relevant factor for promoting
U.S. health policy objectives, namely expanding the delivery of charity care
and other community-oriented services.
By contrast, the Service's
continued emphasis on operational control as a determinative factor is not
likely to serve U.S. health policy objectives.
1. Operational Control and Charitable Activity
The IRS's current focus on operational control assumes that the form of a
joint venture's control arrangement is related to the substance of its
conduct; it is premised on the assumption that only those ventures that are
"controlled" by exempt entities effectively fulfill charitable goals, and those
ventures not so controlled are unlikely to do the same.2 °7 However, much
evidence from the social science literature challenges this assumption. This
evidence comes from empirical studies examining whether a hospital's
behavior is related to its type of ownership, nonprofit or for-profit, since
type of ownership is the most obvious indicator of control. Three sets of
studies are worth noting.
207. The Tax Court apparently endorsed this assumption in Redlands by noting that
"there is something in common between the structure of petitioner's sole activity and the
nature of petitioner's purposes in engaging in it." Redlands, 113 T.C. at 78.
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One set compares nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in terms of the
amount of charity care they provide, a widely used indicator of community
benefit. 20 8 While these studies generally indicate that nonprofits provide
somewhat more charity care than do their for-profit counterparts, the
differential is not large.20 9 In addition, at least one such study suggests that
the differential is due in large part to differences in where nonprofit and forprofits locate-for-profits are less likely to be located in poor
communities. 210 A second set of studies examines changes in the behavior
of hospitals that convert from nonprofit to for-profit status. 211 These studies
point to few changes in levels of charity care, prices, or service offerings.
A third set of studies compares the pricing patterns of nonprofit and forprofit hospitals. While some older studies point to more aggressive pricing
practices by for-profit hospitals, 2 12 more recent studies suggest that
nonprofit hospitals are as inclined as for-profits to capitalize on market
213
power to raise prices.
In addition to these empirical studies, there is persuasive anecdotal
evidence that suggests that the control status of hospitals is a poor proxy for
charitable activity. In particular, local communities across the country are
becoming increasingly critical of hospitals that are exempted from property
and other local taxes, but then fail to provide an adequate level of
community services. Indeed, some communities are now requiring these
208. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Lewin et al., Setting the Record Straight: The Provision of
Uncompensated Care by Not-for-ProfitHospitals, 5 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1212, 1215 (1988);
GAO, PUB. No. GAO/HRD-90-84, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS: BETTER STANDARDS NEEDED FOR
TAX EXEMPTION (May 1990), availableat http://www.gao.gov.
209. See supra note 208.
210. See Edward C. Norton & Douglas 0. Staiger, How Hospital Ownership Affects
Access to Carefor the Uninsured,25 RAND J. EcON. 171, 184 (1994).
211. Young & Desai, supra note 6, at 149; Jack Needleman et al., Uncompensated Care
and Hospital Conversions in Florida,HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 125; Kenneth E.
Thorpe et al., Hospital Conversions, Margins, and the Provision of Uncompensated Care,
HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 87; Blumenthal & Weissman, supra note 67, at 159.
212. J. Michael Watt et al., The Effects of Ownership and Multihospital System
Membership on Hospital FunctionalStrategies and Economic Performance, in FOR-PROFIT
ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 287 (Bradford H. Gray ed., 1986); Lawrence S. Lewin et al.,
Investor-Owneds and Nonprofits Differ in Economic Performance, HOSPS., July 1, 1981, at
57.
213. Emmett B. Keeler et al., The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-Profit and
For-ProfitHospitalPricingBehavior, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 69, 83 (1999). But see Robert A.
Connor et al., The Effects of Market Concentrationand Horizontal Mergers on Hospitals
Costs and Prices, 5 INT'L J. ECON. Bus. 159, 159-175 (1998) (finding little difference
between non-profits and for-profits, but also concluding that consolidation in hospital
services had actually resulted in lower prices in some markets); William J. Lynk, Nonprofit
Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L. & ECON. 437, 441 (1995)
(finding that nonprofit hospitals are somewhat less aggressive in using market power to
extract higher prices from insurance plans and other payers of hospitals care services).
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hospitals to make payments in lieu of taxes. 214 For similar reasons, some
states and local communities have taken steps to exact greater
accountability from their tax-exempt hospitals by requiring them to submit
2 15
annual reports detailing the community services they provide.
In light of this evidence, the IRS's insistence that operational control of
WHJVs be in the hands of the tax-exempt, nonprofit provider, and the
implicit assumption that such a requirement will ensure better community
medical care, appears naive. It need hardly be said that simply because a
tax-exempt provider has initiation rights in a joint venture it will necessarily
exercise those rights in a manner that promotes charitable activity. 216 The
available evidence suggests that neither board control nor any other
criterion that focuses purely on the form or structure of a joint venture is a
particularly reliable indicator of a healthcare organization's commitment to
charitable activity.
2. Operational Control and Future Joint Venture Activity
In addition to the foregoing evidence suggesting that Revenue Ruling 9815 will not promote health policy objectives, there is also reason to believe
it will actually undermine such objectives. The ruling has likely had a
chilling effect on the formation of joint ventures between tax-exempt
hospital providers and for-profit entities, particularly WHJVs, at a time
when such ventures are likely to be important to the future viability of tax214. Andrew L. Hyams et al., Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption: A Review of Legal
and Policy Developments in Defining Hospital Responsibilities to Providing Charity Care
(1998) (unpublished report submitted to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation) (on file with
author).
215. Id. For example, both California and Texas require hospitals to submit such
reports. Id.
216. The seminal question raised by this statistical and anecdotal research (showing little
positive correlation between nonprofit status and the effective provision of community
services) is why nonprofit ownership of hospitals does not appear to result consistently in the
better provision of community services. One answer may be found in agency theory, which
has long been used by economists and management scholars to explore the conflicting
incentives that principals and agents often face in both nonprofit and for-profit organizations.
Agency theorists have observed that, in larger, more complex organizations, the principalsi.e. company owners-typically have little meaningful oversight over their agentsmanagers employed to maximize shareholder (or other ownership) value for the principals.
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 308-09 (1983). Such a disconnect is especially likely in the nonprofit hospital
context, in which the principals are not shareholders with a concrete financial investment at
risk, but rather community stakeholders whose ownership interests are more abstract and
thus perhaps not safeguarded with the same degree of vigilance. See id. at 318-19
(hypothesizing, however, that an effective community board may serve to bridge the gap
between nonprofit "ownership" and management). In this context, it is inevitable that
managers of nonprofit hospitals will often act in their own best interests rather than those of
community stakeholders. But see id. See also Young, supra note 198, at 355.
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exempt hospital providers. Although a precise census of these joint
ventures on a year-by-year basis is not publicly available, healthcare
attorneys and other industry observers have noted that that the number of
21 7 Certainly, some of
new WHJVs has been on the decline in recent years.
this decline can be attributed to the enactment of state laws regulating such
2 18 But numerous
transactions, as well as other business-related factors.
anecdotal reports point also to the chilling effect of the IRS's rule. In
several publicly-reported accounts, tax-exempt and for-profit entities
existing
acknowledged that the ruling prompted them to either unwind
219
For-profit
WHJVs or discontinue plans to form such ventures.
they
where
ventures
in
participate
to
reluctant
be
to
likely
organizations are
to
devotes
venture
the
money
of
lack authority to limit the amount
are
providers
hospital
unprofitable activities. At the same time, tax-exempt
likely to concerned about the risks that WHJVs carry for their exempt status
in any arrangement where they do not posses operational control through
majority control of the board.
Given this possible chilling effect, Revenue Ruling 98-15 may very well
undermine United States health policy objectives in two ways. First, it may
have a negative effect on the future accessibility of hospital services. Many
tax-exempt providers now operate in a highly challenging business
Indeed,
environment in which their long-term viability is threatened.
nonand
during the 1990s, a substantial number of hospitals (both for-profit
profit) closed, often due to the pressures of competition and tighter
2 21 Policy makers and analysts
Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement policies.
are concerned that such closings are leaving certain (particularly rural and
inner-city) areas of the country with severely reduced, and likely inadequate

217. See, e.g., Leigh Walton et al., For-Profitand Non-Profit Joint Ventures: Recent
Guidance for Hospital and Ancillary Services Collaborations, HEALTH L. UPDATE (Bass,
Berry & Sims, PLC, Nashville, Tenn.), July 2002, available at http://www.bassberry.com/
resources/health (last visited April 7, 2004).
218. See Donahue, supra note 6, at 63-74 (evaluating a variety of approaches taken by
states in regulating the sale of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit entities).
219. See, e.g., Jon Aspund, IRS Joint-Venture Rules Make One Potential PartnerBack
Out, AHA NEWS, April 13, 1998, at 4; Cynthia F. Reaves & Jay E. Gerzog, Unwind of
Columbia/HCA Whole HospitalJoint Venture in Northern Virginia May Just Be the Writing
On the Wall, 23 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 455, 455 (1999); Kristen Hallam, IRS Rule Might
Slow Joint Ventures, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 9, 1998, at 3.
220. See supra text and accompanying notes at Section lI.B.
221. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. (OIG), U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (HHS),
CLOSURE: 1990-2000 (May 2003),
PUB. No. OEI 04-02-00611, TRENDS IN URBAN HOSPITAL
4 2
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-0 -0 -0061 1.pdf; OIG, HHS, PUB. No. OEI
CLOSURE: 1990-2000 (May 2003), available at
04-02-00610, TRENDS IN RURAL HOSPITAL
4
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-0 -02-00610.pdf.
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hospital capacity. 222 Although the extent to which a more flexible IRS rule
would reduce the number of closings is not clear, WHJVs offer tax-exempt
hospital providers an alternative to closure by affording them an
opportunity to secure managerial expertise and financial resources while
retaining some role in the governance of the hospital. AJVs likewise
represent a potentially important source of revenue that financially strapped
hospitals could draw upon if they did not fear that such arrangements might
cause them to lose their exempt status.
Second, and somewhat paradoxically, Revenue Ruling 98-15 may
contribute to the incidence of tax-exempt hospital providers that convert
their hospitals entirely to for-profit ownership.2 23 A conversion represents
another alternative to closure for hospitals whose viability is threatened by
financial pressures. In contrast to a WHJV, which preserves some role for
the tax-exempt provider in the governance of the hospitals, a conversion
results in the total loss to the community of the tax-exempt provider.
Whether a greater share of for-profit ownership in the U.S. hospital industry
is beneficial to consumers is a longstanding debate,224 but it appears that
most communities prefer to keep their nonprofit hospitals nonprofit. 225
VI. CONCLUSION

At the time the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 98-15, tax-exempt hospital
providers were looking for guidance from the IRS regarding joint venture
arrangements with for-profit entities, particularly those that involved the
entire hospital. Although this ruling offers guidance, it does so in the form
of a requirement as to the joint venture's form of governance rather than the
substance of its actual conduct. This approach is not a corollary of existing
tax law principles. Nor is it beneficial for achieving U.S health policy
objectives.
Accordingly, the IRS should reconsider Revenue Ruling 98-15. The
agency should provide exempt hospital providers with guidance relating to
the actual commitments a joint venture makes to the provision of charitable
care and other community services. The guidance should be consistent with
the community benefit standard. Further, the IRS should hold tax-exempt
providers accountable for these commitments.
222. Karen Pallarito, Good, Bad Results Come from Urban Hospital
Closures, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Nov. 25, 1996, at 3; Susan Reif et al., Community Perceptions
of the Effects of
Rural Hospital Closure on Access to Care, 15 J. RURAL HEALTH 168,
168-69 (1999); Ron
Todt, HospitalOverloadsBecoming a Worry, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Jan. 13, 2001, at 1 A.

223.

Hallam, supra note 219, at 3.

224.

See generally FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE (Bradford
H. Gray ed.,

1986).
225.

See supra note 6.
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